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ABSTRACT 
In October 2015 China’s “one-child policy” was replaced by a universal two-child 
policy. The impacts of the new policy are inevitably speculative, but predictions can 
be made based on recent trends.  The population increase will be relatively small, 
peaking at 1.45 billion in 2029 (compared with a peak 1.4 billion in 2023 if the one-
child policy continued). The new policy will allow almost all Chinese to have their 
preferred number of children. The benefits of the new policy include: a large 
reduction in abortions of unapproved pregnancies, virtual elimination of the problem 
of unregistered children, and a lower sex ratio.  All of these should improve health 
outcomes. Impacts of the new policy on the shrinking workforce and rapid population 
aging will not be evident for two decades. In the meantime more sound policy actions 
need to be taken to meet the social, health and care needs of the elderly population.  
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INTRODUCTION  
In October 2015 China announced that the iconic “one-child policy” had finally been replaced 
by a universal two-child policy.  This change is highly significant, since for the first time in 36 
years, no-one in China is restricted to having just one child. In this review we examine the 
evidence for the potential impacts of this policy shift.  These impacts are inevitably 
speculative, but a body of research has developed, which aims to foresee the demographic, 
health, social and consequent policy impacts of the universal two-child policy from recent 
trends. Because much of this research is based on the impacts of the preceding policy, we 
start with an analysis of the impact and controversies surrounding the one-child policy. 
 
1. THE ONE CHILD POLICY  
The one-child policy was introduced in 1979 by the Chinese government who saw population 
containment as essential to lifting China out of severe poverty caused by decades of 
economic mismanagement.1   Between 1950 and 1970 the population had increased from 
540 million to over 800 million.2  In response the government introduced the mostly voluntary 
“later-longer-fewer” policy, which encouraged later childbearing, longer spacing and fewer 
children.  This led to a dramatic fall in the total fertility rate (TFR) from an estimated 5.9 in 
1970 to 2.9 by 1979.  Despite this downward trajectory in fertility, fears of overpopulation 
persisted, and so the one-child policy was introduced.  Following the introduction of the 
Policy the TFR continued to fall but less precipitously.  Data from numerous sources 
conclude that by the late-1990s the TFR had reduced to between 1.5 and 1.8, and it has 
remained at this level since.3,4 (Figure 1). 
 
The one-child rule was strictly enforced for urban residents, who in 1980 accounted for about 
20% of the population, but nearly half by 2010.  In rural areas this rule was particularly 
unpopular and deemed virtually unenforceable,5  so from 1984 rural couples in the majority 
of provinces were allowed to have a second child where their first was a girl, the so-called 
1.5 child policy.  In the six north-western provinces all rural couples were allowed a second 
child, irrespective of the sex of the first child.  Two or more children were allowed for ethnic 
minorities, who account for around 9% of the total population.2 This created a marked rural-
urban difference in TFR.6  Enforcement was the responsibility of the then powerful National 
Family Planning Commission.  The system of penalties was unpopular and inconsistently 
applied, with wide variations across the country, often at the discretion of local officials.7  
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As one of the most controversial policies in history, debate has raged over the positive and 
negative impacts of the one-child policy.  The authorities claim that 400 million births have 
been prevented, which contributed to increasing per capita GDP.8  But this is contested by 
claims that the higher number of prevented births includes the effects of the later-longer-
fewer policy, and that the one-child policy has prevented closer to 200 million births.9  In 
addition, many scholars believe that rapid economic development alone would have reduced 
fertility substantially, as has been the case in many other developing countries, such as 
Thailand where the TFR decreased from 5.6 to 2.1 between 1970 and 1990.10  This together 
with the very rapid fall in fertility during the later-longer-fewer policy, raises the obvious 
question of whether the one-child policy was ever necessary at all. 
 
The health outcomes of the one-child policy are also debated.  Women have benefited from 
fewer pregnancies and births, which has contributed to the fall in the maternal mortality rate 
over the last three decades.11 However, this has been at the costs of deprivation of 
reproductive choice, not only in family size, but also in contraceptive choice.  The insertion of 
intrauterine devices postpartum without formal consent was routine in rural China, with 
permission needed for removal to have a second child.12  Pregnancies which were 
unapproved under the policy (including any occurring outside marriage) have always been 
problematic.  Most women undergo abortions voluntarily, but there are many accounts of 
forced abortions and sterilisations ordered by over-zealous local officials.  Atrocities such as 
these peaked in the early years of the one-child policy, but have been rare over the last 
decade. 7  
 
Significantly, there have been social benefits for women with an acceleration of movement 
towards gender equality.  Traditional son-preference led many Chinese parents to invest 
relatively little in their daughters, but in the absence of brothers, household resources could 
focus on daughters.13  Recent studies have found no significant differences between single-
girl and single-boy families in relation to health outcomes and education (in terms of access, 
aspiration or achievement), although differences are found between boy and girl siblings, 
with boys attending school on average six months longer.14,15  Females now account for 52% 
of undergraduates and 48% of postgraduates.16  Low fertility has also increased the chances 
of well-paid work and career advancement for women.  Over 25% of CEOs of medium and 
large Chinese companies are women.17 This has all contributed to improved health 
outcomes for young and middle-aged women. 
 
A further controversy is the degree to which the one-child policy has contributed to the highly 
skewed sex ratio at birth (SRB).  The SRB, defined as the number of male births for every 
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100 females, started to rise after the onset of the one-child policy, but this trend accelerated 
further after diagnostic ultrasound for sex determination became available from the late 
1980s.18  Although sex determination  is illegal in China,19 the high SRB demonstrates the 
lack of effective enforcement.  The SRB peaked at 121 in 2005, with latest estimates 
showing a fall to 116 in 2014, but with ratios as high as 140 in parts of rural central  
China.19, 20 In rural areas the SRB rises dramatically with second births, as couples try to 
ensure a male birth within the two child limit. By 2020 it is estimated that there will be around 
30 million excess, and hence unmarriageable, men in the reproductive age group in a 
country where getting married and having children is still a strong cultural expectation.19, 21  
This has considerable mental health consequences: evidence indicates that never-married 
middle-aged and older men suffer significantly higher levels of depression,22, 23 they are 
more prone to aggression than married men, and may be more easily drawn into crime, 
leading to concerns about social instability.20, 24, 25 
 
There is also considerable debate around the effects of the one-child policy on the well-
being of children.  These effects have been characterised by a stereotype of parents and 
grandparents over-indulging the only child, creating spoiled, selfish, unsociable and obese 
“little emperors”.26  But, the evidence is mixed.  For example, studies which control for 
confounders, show only children have higher academic achievement, higher self-esteem and 
greater confidence, 27-30 all of which may contribute to better health outcomes.  This is partly 
attributed to household resources being directed toward the only child with overall beneficial 
effects in terms of education and health.31 However, there is also evidence to the contrary: a 
series of studies in young adult soldiers have shown that soldiers with siblings are 
significantly more motivated, hard-working, obedient, sociable, and mentally stable than 
those who are only children.32-36  
 
There is less controversy about the effects of the one-child policy on the rapidly growing 
aging population.37  Indeed fears about this have probably been the most influential factor in 
the decision to lift the one-child policy.  While the increase in aging populations is a global 
phenomenon, the one-child policy has rapidly accelerated the process in China.  The impact 
of large numbers of only children on family structures has its own name in China: the “4:2:1” 
phenomenon, referring to couples who are responsible for the care of their four older parents 
and one child.  Although the state-sponsored New Rural Old Age Insurance Programme 
started in 2009, most Chinese elderly people, especially those in rural areas, still lack full 
pension coverage, so are largely dependent on offspring for financial support.6,38  This 
occurs in a setting where Confucian tradition still dictates that care of the elderly parents is a 
filial duty. China is perhaps unique in having laws that adult children can be compelled to 
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provide financial support to their elderly parents.39 This places a considerable burden on 
4:2:1 families. While sons have traditionally supported parents financially,40 daughters (and 
sons-in-law) have generally performed the caring roles for their older parents.41,42  So the 
shortage of women, partially caused by the one-child policy, is affecting the quantity and 
quality of elderly care, especially in rural areas.  The growth in the elderly population is also 
putting serious pressures on the health system, which is not yet adapted to deal with the 
complex and expensive co-morbidities of an aging population.43 
 
2. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIVERSAL TWO-CHILD POLICY  
Demographers warned of the negative consequences of the one-child policy almost from the 
outset.44-50 Their arguments centered around the fact that the “demographic dividend”, that 
is, the accelerated economic growth which results from a decline in fertility and mortality, 
was reversing.  Soon the negative consequences were beginning to outweigh the positive.  
The negatives include accelerating population aging, the skewed sex ratio, and the decline 
in the working age population which would threaten economic growth.  Moreover, in 1980 
the government had pledged that the one-child policy would last for just one generation, so 
change was overdue.  But contrary to the views of most demographers,6, 50-54 the govern-
ment feared that lifting the Policy would lead to a baby boom,  
 
So the government’s response has been cautious with a series of gradual “exemptions”.  By 
2007 all provinces (except Henan, which followed in 2011) had started to permit couples 
who were both only-children to have two children.  In November 2013, came the so-called 
“two-child for only-child couples” policy, allowing couples where at least one of the marital 
partners is an only-child to have a second child.  But by May 2015, only 1.45 million (13.2%)  
of 11 million eligible couples applied for permission to have a second child.55  The low 
uptake has been attributed to the high cost of child-rearing in cities, as the overwhelming 
majority of these eligible couples were unsurprisingly urban residents. 56  The couples who 
applied for a second child were younger, had  higher household income, a young first child 
more likely to be girl, and parents who wanted a second grandchild.57  This low uptake, 
together with appeals from scholars and  the media, have probably accelerated the 
announcement of the universal two-child policy.  
 
3.THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE UNIVERSAL TWO-CHILD POLICY 
 
3.1 The impacts on fertility 
The fertility level after the universal two-child policy is a key factor that will affect population 
growth, the proportion of elderly people, the workforce and economic development, the sex 
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ratio, public health, health systems  and the environment, all of which will be discussed in the 
rest of this paper.  But the effects of the new policy may be less than expected.  There is 
now clear evidence that the role of fertility policy is diminishing fast, and that fertility in 
contemporary China, as elsewhere, is socio-economically determined.7,10 
 
Surveys of fertility preference undertaken over the past two decades show that China has 
indeed become a low fertility culture,58-60 and such surveys are generally thought to 
somewhat overestimate actual fertility.61,62  The overall consensus from these studies is that 
around 90% of women report they want one or two children, while in large cities nearly two-
thirds of women state a preference for only one child.  Reasons given include the high cost 
of child rearing, especially for education, and the impact on parental lifestyle and on the 
mother’s career. 63--65 
 
The challenge is that future fertility cannot be accurately forecast, because of its various 
uncertain determinants.  For example, the lower fertility preference in urban areas together 
with the current drive towards urbanisation, (70% urbanisation planned by 2030), is likely to 
keep fertility low. However, a number of scholars believe the two-child choice will gather 
momentum.66   We present here the most likely future scenario of Chinese fertility transition 
in the next few decades based on various demographic analyses.  Given the lower 
socioeconomic level in rural areas, and the fact that minority ethnic groups are allowed three 
or more children, it is estimated that the TFR in rural and urban areas will rise from the 
current 2.01 and 1.24, respectively to 2.15 and 1.67 in the next decade.  The combined 
rural-urban TFR is estimated to be 1.88 in 2017 and 1.81 in 2030, 6 
 
In the discussion to follow, we explore the projected impacts of the universal two-child policy, 
drawing comparisons with the scenario of the one-child policy remaining in place.  These are 
based on population projections using the assumed TFRs outlined above, and with the same 
background demographic parameters (such as medium mortality and rural-urban 
migration).6 
 
3.2 Impacts on population aging 
As shown in Figure 2, the Chinese population is aging quickly under either policy scheme.  
The percentage of over-65s under the universal two-child policy is expected to reach 18% in 
2030, with the proportion about twice as high in rural versus urban areas.6, 67  As previously 
noted, aging is a global phenomenon: today the UK’s over-65s account for 17% of the total 
population, and Japan’s 26%.68  It is the rapid acceleration in the aging population 
associated with the one-child policy which has created a significant challenge for China and 
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the comparative projection results presented in Figure 2 show that population aging will be 
substantially less serious with the universal two-child policy than if the one-child policy 
remained unchanged. There are two particularly vulnerable groups of elderly persons in 
China. The first is the so-called empty-nesters (living in households without children) mainly 
caused by the large out-migration of young people during rapid urbanisation and job 
mobility.6,37  Around half of these empty-nesters live alone and half with a spouse.69 Their 
numbers will rise over the next two decades and the proportion in rural areas will grow to 
twice of that in urban areas by 2050 6. Empty-nesters, especially those living alone are 
especially prone to mental health problems.70 The second vulnerable group is the disabled 
elderly.  A recent study has predicted the number of disabled over-65s will increase rapidly 
from 8.4 million in 2010 to 19 and 37million in 2030 and 2050, respectively.71  Many of these 
are in the extreme elderly (over-80) age group and their health care, personal and social 
care needs present a huge challenge. 
 
3.3 Impacts on population size, workforce and economic development  
 
The universal two-child policy is predicted to lead to a peak population of around 1.45 billion 
in 2029 and then gradually decline (Table 1).  Under a continuing one-child policy scenario 
the population would peak at around 1.4 billion in 2023 and then rapidly decline (Table 1)  
The total population size  under the one-child policy would be smaller than under the 
universal two-child policy (Table 1), and this would cause serious problems for aging, 
pension fund deficiencies and labour shortages.72, 73  Under a continuing one-child policy 
two-fifths of the reduced population size in 2030, and one-half in 2050, would be aged 18-
64, that is of working age, and the other reductions would be in children aged 0-17, that is 
the forthcoming workforce. 6 (Figure 3)   The new policy will not have an effect on the 
workforce in the short-term. It will slowly decline until 2020 and moderately decline from 
2020 to 2030, with no difference between the two policies. But beyond 2030 increased births 
under the universal two-child  policy  should lead to a substantially larger workforce, by 30 
and 60 million working-age individuals in 2040 and 2050, respectively, compared to the 
unchanged one-child policy (Figure 3). This is very important because a large working age 
population has been shown to be crucial to economic growth.One estimate is that about 27% 
of the increase in Chinese GDP from 1982 to 2000 was due to the large working-age 
population, which resulted from the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s.74  Elsewhere in 
Asia, plentiful labour contributed substantially to the rapid growth of GDP in South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong in 1970s and 1980s.75 These all add strength to the 
positive and economic impacts of the universal two-child policy.76,77 
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The elderly dependency ratio will increase sharply under either policy scenario. Defined as 
the number of persons aged over-65 divided by number of working-age persons aged 18-64, 
it is of course desirable that this figure remains low in any population.  Only after 2030 will 
the demographic benefits of the two-child policy become evident in producing a considerable 
lower elderly dependency ratio than the one-child policy. 6 (Figure 4).   
 
Further, the universal two-child policy transition will result in greater consumption and job 
opportunities associated with childbearing and childrearing, which will contribute to economic 
growth.   
 
3.4 Impacts on the sex ratio  
The 2000 census data shows that in the 1.5-child policy areas, the SRB was as high as 125 
compared with 109 in two-child policy areas, which provides evidence that the 1.5 child 
policy has specifically exacerbated China’s high sex ratio at birth (SRB).78  This policy was 
interpreted by  many Chinese  as implying that one boy was sufficient to ensure family 
welfare, but one girl was not, and hence that female children had lesser value, thus 
reinforcing the culture of son-preference and increasing China’s SRB.4,79,80  Evidence of this 
effect emerged from an experimental programme conducted in four rural areas (with a total 
population of 8 million) in four provinces.  In these areas a two-child policy operated from the 
mid-1980s.  The result was substantially lower sex ratios than those in the surrounding rural 
areas where the 1.5-child policy had been implemented.81 Furthermore, it has been 
mathematically demonstrated that slightly more than one quarter of the excess SRB in the 
1.5-child areas is due to the structural effects of not allowing couples whose first child is a 
boy to have a second birth.4  On this evidence, adopting the universal two-child policy will 
make significant contributions to reducing the SRB in China, but it is unlikely to totally 
normalise for s to come, because of long-standing tradition of son preference especially in 
rural areas, and continued access to sex-selective technologies.  
 
3.5 Impacts on population health 
Replacing the one-child policy with the universal two-child policy will have positive impacts 
on health for children, adults and the elderly.   
 
(1) The health consequences for children  
The new policy will greatly reduce or eliminate some of the most serious impacts of the one-
child policy.  Albeit uncommon, the practice of abandonment of unwanted girls soon after 
birth, with institutionalisation in orphanages and negative health and social consequences, 
should become much rarer.  Similarly, “black-listed” out-of-quota children should disappear.  
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These are children without household registration, caused by their parents’ violation of the 
one-child policy and their refusal or inability to pay the penalty.  Lacking registration creates 
barriers to the child’s educational opportunity and social status, with consequent poorer 
mental health outcomes in many of these children.82 In fact, with the announcement of the 
two-child policy, the status of existing black-listed children is being normalised.83 The new 
policy is also likely to reduce discrimination in nutrition, education and health care against 
girls, which persists in some rural areas.84  
 
(2) Health consequences for adults.  
The new policy should substantially reduce the tragedy of many millions of abortions, due to 
so-called “out-of-quota” second pregnancies.  In addition, there will be a marked reduction in 
sex-selective abortions, which presents a considerable health risk, since they are of 
necessity conducted late, during the second trimester.85 Of course as the SRB decreases 
with the new policy, there will be a concomitant reduction in the numbers of unmarriageable 
men with higher rates of depression and other mental health problems.20, 23  
 
(3) Impacts on elders 
Perhaps the most feared family tragedy under the one-child policy was the premature death 
of an only child.  Data from the 2000 census showed that the average probability of the only-
child’s death before their mother reached ages 45, 80, 85 and 90 were 4%, 11.6%, 15.5% 
and 21.4%, respectively.86  Permanent childlessness for a couple or lone parent can have 
potentially serious consequences for their mental and physical health,87 especially when 
many Chinese elders are dependent on offspring for care.  Demographers have estimated 
that there were about one million permanently childless families due to death of the only-
child in 2010 and the number has been increasing by about 78,000 every year.88 It is 
expected that this socially undesirable trend will substantially decline under the universal 
two-child policy.  
 
Evidence from longitudinal healthy aging surveys indicates that elderly people cared for by 
daughters (and sons-in-law) rather than sons (and daughters-in-law) have a lower mortality 
risk and lower probability of declining cognitive capacity.41, 89  Further evidence suggests that 
older parents are more satisfied with care provided by daughters than sons, and that older 
parents have better relationships with their daughters than sons.42  The one-child policy 
prevented almost half of all couples from having a daughter;  the new policy will enable 
many more couples the opportunity of a daughter.  The outcome will eventually enable more 
elderly parents to benefit from the care of daughters, thus enhancing their mental and 
physical health. 41,42  
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3.6  Impacts  on health systems  
 
While the new policy is unlikely to lead to a very large increase in the average birth rate for 
China as whole, highly heterogeneous development across the country means that 
increases in fertility may be marked in particular localities, such as in some rural areas and 
small towns. The authorities will need to monitor these changes locally, so that increased 
capacity in health services, especially maternal and child health services, can be planned, as 
necessary.   
 
A major concern is the acute shortage of paediatricians and paediatric nurses across the 
country, which has worsened over the past decade.90  Lower incomes, highly pressurised 
working conditions and  demanding parents all contribute to the unpopularity of paediatrics 
as a speciality.91 So any increase in birth rate resulting from the two-child policy will 
exacerbate pressures on an already stressed system. A recent study, based on birth rate 
predictions until 2020, estimated that around 190,000 more paediatricians are currently 
needed. 92 While overall numbers of personnel in the maternal and child health services are 
sufficient, there are concerns for the quality of these services.91 This could deteriorate if 
pressure on these services increases with the birth rate.   
 
3.7 Impacts on natural resources and environment  
In the past few decades, growth in the Chinese population has been widely assumed to 
threaten natural resources and the environment.  However, evidence suggests that this is 
unlikely to occur as a consequence of the universal two-child policy.  Firstly, the overall 
increase in population will be modest with a peak of approximately 3% higher total 
population than would occur under the one-child policy scenario.  Second, it is true that in 
2011 water and land resources per capita in China were reduced by 30% and 36% 
compared with 1979 attributable to population growth.  But the declines levelled-off after 
2000.  Under the universal two-child policy, the Chinese average water resource per capita 
and average arable land per capita would reach the lowest value around 2029, reduced by 
about 2% and 6% respectively compared to 2011, and then start to gradually increase as the 
total population size decreases after 2029.6 
 
3.8 The other impacts  
The new policy will allow almost all couples to meet their reproductive preference.58,59  No 
longer will couples face the consequences of penalties and stress associated with having an 
unapproved second child.  A divisiveness was created by the one-child policy, with different 
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rules applying to neighbours and friends, as well as resentment towards the wealthy who 
were able to afford the penalties for having two children.  These negative effects are 
expected to be totally eliminated.  Further, the new policy will greatly reduce the corruption 
associated with the enforcement of the one-child policy.  This included bribing of officials for 
permission for more than one child, and the often unregulated collection of fines from birth 
control violators.50  All of these outcomes will help to create a more “harmonious society”, an 
attribute highly regarded by the Chinese government and the people.  
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
4.1   Population  aging  
 
The universal two-child policy was introduced principally to address the serious challenges 
of population aging, one of the greatest challenges for China in the 21st century. However, in 
the next twenty years the universal two-child policy will have only a marginal effect on the 
rapid acceleration in population aging.   Compared to some industrialised countries where 
room for increasing fertility, raising retirement age and expanding pension programmes in 
rural areas are very limited, China has three unique opportunities to address the challenge of 
rapid population aging.  Firstly, the universal two-child policy will substantially increase 
fertility in some localities, especially in rural areas and small towns.  Secondly, the 
exceptionally low compulsory retirement age can be raised.  The retirement age in China, 55 
for women and 60 for men, is among the lowest in the world.  Evidence shows that 
increasing the retirement age improves physical and mental health outcomes.93   It prolongs 
pension contributions, improving the financial stability of the pension system, 94 while 
increasing post-retirement payments.  It will also ameliorate the predicted labour shortage, 
seen as a consequence of 36 years of the one-child policy, while also buying the time 
needed for the benefits of the universal two-child policy to be fully realised.  Thirdly, state-
sponsored pension systems must be strengthened, especially in rural areas, where rapid 
aging will be a greater problem in the coming decades, due to continuing rural-urban 
migration of young people.6  These new rural old age insurance programs will  not only 
enhance senior citizens’ welfare, but also create a huge amount of capital by collecting 
premiums from hundreds of millions of new programme participants. This will contribute to 
further economic development. Greater financial independence for the elderly will also 
reduce reliance on sons, resulting in a more enlightened attitude towards the relative value 
of sons and daughters.   
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In addition to these three fundamental policy actions, the authorities should improve 
awareness and actively encourage change in a number of areas.  Three-generation living 
arrangements (either co-residence or close proximity) should be encouraged. These are 
perhaps especially appropriate in China, given the long and deep-rooted tradition of filial 
piety to old people.95  Evidence suggests that older parents who live with their adult children 
have better cognitive function, self-rated health, and life satisfaction.96 Since grandparents 
traditionally take-on childcare responsibilities, such arrangements increase the workforce 
participation of female adult children, with consequent financial and health benefits.97   They 
also  decrease home-based care expenditures for disabled elderly.98   A policy encouraging 
three-generation living was very successful in Singapore.99  In particular support for rural 
elderly people to go to live with, or near, city-dwelling children should be a priority.  
 
Further, the  benefits of daughters rather than sons for old age care 41,42 should be widely 
publicised.  Older parents should be encouraged to live with (or nearby) an adult daughter 
and son-in-law, even if they have both son and daughter. This would gradually change the 
tradition of daughters marrying-out of their own families, would be beneficial for older adults, 
and also help to reduce son preference, with obvious effects on the SRB.  
 
Finally, although the SRB will decline with the beneficial effects of a more balanced sex ratio 
in the reproductive years, especially in rural areas, these effects can only be gradual. In the 
meantime the needs of aging single men, as an especially vulnerable group, will require 
recognition in policy. 
 
Overall, if sound policy actions are promptly and effectively taken, China should be able to 
successfully address the challenges of population aging. 
 
4.2 Health systems 
 
The shortfall in health personnel, especially in paediatrics, requires short term and long term 
solutions. In the short term, much of the work currently carried-out by paediatricians in acute 
hospitals is primary care in nature, and could be provided by maternal and child health 
doctors in community health centres. Such personnel would need to undergo enhanced 
short-term training in paediatrics, to upgrade their skills and thus improve service quality. In 
the longer term measures must be taken to make paediatrics more attractive as a speciality, 
for example through bonus systems, improved working conditions, and incentives (linked to 
lower co-payments) for parents to use primary care services and thus reduce the huge 
pressures on specialist paediatric services.   
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In addition, the opportunity to harness and redeploy the huge family planning workforce 
seems obvious.  This comprises over five million administrative bureaucrats and field 
workers. 5 There will be considerable spare capacity under the universal two-child policy, 
because the bureaucratic infrastructure for birth approvals and punishments for out-of-quota 
second births will no longer be required.  Training and redeployment of the current family 
planning workforce in elderly care and healthy aging social work would seem an obvious 
solution to address the challenges of the continued growth of an aging population while 
providing productive jobs for these workers. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Since the onset of the one-child policy massive socio-economic change in China has led to a 
low fertility culture. The two-child policy will therefore not result in a baby boom, but rather a 
moderate increase in fertility.  But the many negative impacts of one-child policy will 
disappear and nearly all Chinese will have their desired family size. The next step, the total 
removal of the fertility control policy, needs to be considered sooner rather than later.  
 
In short, in the coming decades the universal two-child policy will help to address  the 
challenge of population aging,  reduce the SRB, remove the more oppressive elements of 
the one-child Policy, contribute to economic growth and allow the overwhelming majority of 
couples to have the number of children they want. The birth rate must be monitored locally, 
so that improved capacity can be planned in maternal and child health services, as 
necessary.  We believe that the introduction of the universal two-child policy was a 
necessary and highly desirable action which will be beneficial for all sectors of Chinese 
society.  
 
 
Text box 
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Table 1. Projected population size (in 100 millions)  
under different fertility policy scenarios 
Year Universal two-
child policy 
One-child 
policy 
2010 13.40 13.40 
2020 14.23 13.96 
2030 14.45 13.86 
2040 14.41 13.48 
2050 14.20 12.69 
Peak year of population 
size 
2029 2023 
Population size in peak 
year 
14.45 13.99 
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Figure 1. Total fertility rate from 1950 to 2014 in China  
 
Sources: United Nations Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs World 
Population Prospects World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.  
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Figure 2. Percentages of elderly aged 65+ and elderly aged 65+ living in empty-nest 
households (empty-nesters) among total population 
Source: Redraw based on data from Figures 1 and 3 of Reference 6. 
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 Figure 3. Number of labor force persons aged 18-64 (unit: 100 millions) 
 
Source: Redraw based on data from Figure 5 of Reference 6. 
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Figure 4. Elderly dependency ratios  
 
Source: Redraw based on data from Figures 6 of Reference 6. 
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